"Affirmative consent" means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual activity. Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship between the person involved, or the fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be assumed to be an indicator of consent. affirmative consent programs argue that society needs these programs to address the inadequate response by educational institutions regarding the problems of sexual violence. 10 Others argue that, in practice, such legislation will not facilitate sexual assault prevention and will come with a heavy price tag in the form of constitutional infringements and impositions of pervasive, intrusive standards into students' private lives.
11
This Note addresses various problems relating to the affirmative consent legislation passed in California. Part II discusses some of the major textual and contextual ambiguities of the bill, resulting in little guidance for use by disciplinary committees addressing sexual assault claims. Part III examines the implications of the legislation from both the victims' and accused's viewpoints, examining due process on campus and the legislation's implications on those protections. Part IV analyzes the underlying policy implications of the affirmative consent standard, proposing alternative solutions to better achieve the ever-pressing need for sexual assault reform. Finally, Part V provides a conclusion, arguing that society must do more to change its current perception on sex and sexual assault.
II. WHY "YES" IS NOT ENOUGH: THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
California's affirmative consent legislation requires university and college students to obtain explicit, ongoing consent when engaging in sexual activity. 12 Many feminists and other activists have long argued that one should obtain sexual consent with an active "yes," rather than a mere absence of a "no" from a partner, discounting as hyperbole sentiments that an explicit consent standard "will turn people into unwitting rapists every time they have sex without obtaining an explicit 'yes.'" 13 However, a closer look into the law's textual faults and its omissions of 10 See Emanuella Grinberg, Schools Preach 'Enthusiastic' Yes in Sex Consent Education, CNN (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/03/living/affirmative-consent-school-policy (stating that Berkeley and Columbia University in New York have been the "subject of negative publicity in the past year" over the handling sexual misconduct).
11 Amid New York Governor Cuomo's proposal for affirmative consent legislation, opponents cite the standard as an "over-reach of government into private lives" and "intrusive." Cavaliere, supra note 5. 12 See Susan Kruth, California Governor Signs 'Affirmative Consent' Bill, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.thefire.org/california-governor-signs-affirmative-consentbill ("[U]nder this bill students must receive not just explicit consent to sexual activity but ongoing consent-although it is impossible to tell how often students must pause to receive explicit consent in order for the sexual activity to qualify as consensual."). 13 Young, supra note 8. clear guidance leaves room for the law's inconsistent application, thereby faring no better than its "no means no" counterpart.
According to Senate Bill No. 967, in order to obtain consent, both partners must receive "affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement" from the other.
14 A provision conceding that "relying solely on nonverbal communication can lead to misunderstanding" was cut during revisions, 15 and Bonnie Lowenthal, democratic assemblywoman and a co-author of the legislation, specified that the standard mandates that one "must say 'yes.'" 16 The more familiar "'no means no' standard has been blamed for bringing ambiguity into investigations of sexual assault cases," 17 prompting many supporters of the affirmative consent legislation 18 to believe that their new standard is necessary "because sexual assault on campuses is a gray area that needs to be better defined."
19 Ironically, black-and-white definitions are largely absent from the California legislation, failing to remedy the ambiguity. Accordingly, Senate Bill No. 967 suffers from the same shortcomings as its "no means no" predecessor.
An examination of the role of alcohol and drugs in sexual encounters highlights remaining, unresolved ambiguity. The legislation prohibits the excuse that the accused believed the complainant affirmatively consented to sexual activity if the accused knew that the complainant "was incapacitated due to the influence of drugs, alcohol or medication so that they could not understand the fact, nature, or extent of the sexual activity." 20 Further, even though one may have obtained explicit, verbal, and affirmative consent from a partner, such consent is not valid in a disciplinary proceeding if the accused's "belief in [ CASA COLUMBIA 5 (2007) , available at http://www.casacolumbia.org/addiction-research/reports/wasting-best-brightest-substanceabuse-americas-colleges-universitys. 24 Id. 25 See id. at i ("Each month, half (49.4 percent) of all full-time college students ages 18-22 binge drink, abuse prescription drugs and/or abuse illegal drugs . . . in 2005, almost one in four of these college students (22.9 percent or approximately 1.8 million) met the medical criteria for substance abuse or dependence, almost triple the proportion (8.5 percent) in the general population."). 26 Id. at 5. 27 Failure to give consent is not consent under any standard, including when one is so incapacitated that he or she is not able to give or refuse consent. Julie Watson, California Debates 'Yes Means Yes' SexAssault Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/californiadebates-yes-means-yes-sex-assault-law/2014/08/10/b7ffa86c-20cd-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story .html. California legislature hoped to clearly address this issue. Id. A chief concern stems from the literal reading of these provisions, 29 as they easily give way to the notion that anyone who has been drinking cannot consent. Necessarily, one who is "buzzed," drunk, or high likely lacks sound judgment, so that person is unable to understand the "nature or extent" of the sexual activity in which he or she is about to participate. As a result, one's ability to give or obtain consent is subsequently impaired according to the legislation. 30 A standard of complete sobriety fails to recognize the realities of sexual activity among those of all ages, especially those of typical college-age. 32 Some critics have agreed that Title IX provides a mechanism for women to raise sexual abuse claims after "alcohol-fueled sexual encounters in which the facts are often murky." 33 These opinions stem from a consideration of the naiveté of a common argument, that "if both partners were enthusiastic about [a] sexual encounter, there will be no reason for anyone to report a rape later." 34 This belief fails to account for the instances where one party may regret an act of drunken carelessness and easily 29 The dictionary definition of "incapacitated" includes being "to make (someone or something) unable to work, move or function in the usual way; to make legally incapable or ineligible; and to deprive of capacity or natural power." Incapacitated, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/incapacitate (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). The same dictionary defines "extent" as "the range, distance, or space that is covered or affected by something or included in something." Id. (defining "extent"). 30 See S.B. 967 § 67386. 31 See Laura McMullen, Your Brain on Booze, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT: HEALTH (Mar. 11, 2014), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/health-wellness/articles/2014/03/11/your-brain-on-booze (discussing that the frontal lobes of your brain, which help you make decisions and control urges, "become increasingly suppressed as you drink."). 32 See NAT'L CTR. ON begins to interpret an encounter as non-consensual. 35 These ambiguous questions lead disciplinary committees and university investigations into the very gray area of regulating intoxication. Many institutions may err on the side of caution, finding instances of sexual assault in cases that are actually more ambiguous, especially in light of ongoing federal investigations into prior mishandlings of sexual assault cases.
These are questions that neither the affirmative consent nor the classic "no means no" standard can likely answer and currently do little to help resolve the problems surrounding intoxication, consent, and sexual assault. Yes, these provisions may capture the abhorrent instances where sexual violence occurs while a person is grossly intoxicated and/or completely incapacitated from making decisions while drinking. However, legislators can target such instances by creating a more realistic consent standard, such as that of the "reasonable person."
When asked how an innocent person must prove that he or she, indeed, received consent from another when a partner claims otherwise, Assemblywoman Lowenthal stated, "Your guess is as good as mine. I think it's a legal issue. Like any legal issue, that goes to court." 36 Ironically, however, these "legal issues" do not go to court-they go before a disciplinary committee that makes a decision regarding this exact question, based largely on provisions in Senate Bill No. 967 that Lowenthal, herself, co-authored. 37 Amidst this circular logic, important questions remain unanswered.
III. THE VICTIM SHIFT: TOO LITTLE FOR VICTIMS, TOO LITTLE DUE PROCESS

A. Why Senate Bill No. 967 Is Not Enough
Universities have been criticized for their astonishingly ineffective policies to punish offenders and for their general maladministration of sexual assault cases. 39 One notorious example of such mishandling is the case of Emma Sulkowicz-a student raped on Columbia University's campus-who gained considerable attention for unceasingly carrying her mattress around campus in protest of the university's failure to discipline her attacker, thereby "carrying the weight" of her rape with her. 40 She vowed to do so until her attacker is expelled or leaves. 41 After Sulkowicz came forward with her accusations, two other women also came forward to acknowledge their botched cases of assault against the same student, mishandled "in part by mistake-riddled record-keeping on the part of university authorities," which ultimately resulted in the attacker's exculpation by the university. 42 Their attacker remains on campus.
43
A total of twenty-three students have filed federal complaints against Columbia University for mishandling their cases in violation of Title IX protections of gender equality.
44
Similarly, at Brown University, a man named Andrew 45 was raped in his dorm bathroom by another male previously accused of two other attacks on two separate individuals 46 -offenses which resulted in a mere suspension. 47 Brown assault had been suspended, and the rest were punishable with reprimands, training or probation. A subsequent report showed one student was found guilty of sexual assault and was given a two-term suspension, and the rest of the assault cases hadn't concluded or did not lead to a formal investigation."). 39 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 6. University has made headlines for a number of other mishandled cases, most notably the case of Lena Sclove, who was injured while being brutally choked and raped by a fellow student-a student who subsequently received a mere one-year suspension by the disciplinary committee. 48 Sclove's case prompted a federal Title IX investigation into Brown University's failures in its disciplinary and investigation processes. 49 Brown University responded to the decision by defending its position with a simple statement which "acknowledged [that] decisions 'do not always yield a completely satisfying outcome for someone who has been victimized.'" 50 The University also noted that sexual assault complaint situations are complicated and that it "takes a number of steps, including sexual assault orientation sessions for incoming students, to ensure that every student is aware of applicable policies." 51 These statements ring hollow in light of the recent mismanagements of sexual assault and bear an uncanny similarity to the requirements imposed via California's new legislation. 52 In light of such gross mishandling of important issues surrounding student safety, it seems questionable that California's affirmative consent legislation lacks the bite to compel disciplinary action. 53 Nothing in Senate Bill No. 967 requires universities to actually discipline the accused. 54 The legislation assumes that details of the crime, the accused, and the victim will inevitably see a disciplinary board process, only establishing a more "stringent" 55 standard regarding the policies to be 48 Kingkade, supra note 38. 49 See Kassie, supra note 45. 50 Kingkade, supra note 38. 51 Id. California's bill fails to compel disciplinary proceedings at the state level, instead only implementing policies that affect investigations already commenced. 59 If the legislation intends to keep students safer on campus-a result only possible through suspension and/or expulsion of perpetrators-why not strengthen the bill's bite to "assur[e] that these crimes are taken seriously"? 60 Although requirements under independent federal legislation exist, many have called into question the assumption that schools will conduct thorough investigations and fair disciplinary proceedings. 61 With the recent, publicly exposed failures at the university level, victims of sexual assault on campuses are victims twice-once to the sexual violence and again to the university disciplinary process. These considerations expose the elephant in the room and beg the question: why are we continuing to allow universities that have notoriously mishandled sexual assault cases handle them at all? 62 56 There is no requirement in California's affirmative consent legislation that requires universities to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an accused attacker. See S.B. 967 § 67386. 57 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv)(I) (2012) (requiring schools to institute a statement of policy that includes procedures for institutional disciplinary action in cases of alleged domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault or stalking, requiring the statement into include the following: "Such [disciplinary] proceedings shall (a) provide a prompt, fair, and impartial investigation and resolution, and (II) that such an investigation shall be conducted by officials who receive annual training on the issues related to these issues . . . ."). 
B. Judicially Implemented Due Process Violations of the Accused
Arguably, the most disturbing issues embedded in California's affirmative consent bill are the provisions imposed on alleged perpetrators of sexual assault. A fervent reaction to the epidemic of sexual assault on college campuses, 63 California's legislation dismantles constitutional due process rights for the accused with the imposition of a mere preponderance of the evidence standard 64 for purported felony-level criminal conduct.
65 Senate Bill No. 967 lowers the standard of proof from that of criminal liability, beyond a reasonable doubt, to that of a civil infraction for otherwise criminal activity. The legislation oversteps its constitutional boundaries and cannibalizes its intended effect of positive reform by implementing a lower standard of proof for use in actual disciplinary proceedings, setting the bar much lower than its criminal counterpart to establish culpability.
66
The potential due process implications resulting from California's new legislation are vast and may extend far beyond the standard of review imposed by the legislation.
67
The new policies implemented by the legislation merely "substitut[e] one class of victims for another" by instituting a collective "rush to judgment." The right to receive an education has been held to be neither a fundamental right nor a liberty interest for purposes of substantive due process under the U.S. Constitution. 72 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has never purposefully granted higher education due process protection. 73 Yet, courts have held that due process is owed to students against "the state itself and all of its creatures-boards of education not excepted."
74 Even though these institutions have broad authority to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct, such enforcement must be "exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards."
75 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has assumed, but has never explicitly held, that there is constitutional protection of continued university enrollment rooted in property and liberty rights. 76 Still, the Court has refused to specify whether the Constitution does or does not afford this 70 Lower federal courts have been willing to extend such constitutional protections to college and university level education. 79 For example, in Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, the Fifth Circuit held that public university disciplinary proceedings implicate Fourteenth Amendment due process protection, specifying that it is "not questioned" that public, post-secondary students have constitutionally protected interests in pursuing their education. 80 Other lower courts have also not limited this protection and have extended constitutional safeguards to students pursuing post-secondary education. 81 To the extent that due process applies, what process is due? 82 Continually, courts have been unable to establish a hard and fast rule for such inquiries, but they often center the question around the concept of fairness. 83 The First Circuit emphasized that "[d]ue [p]rocess, which may be said to mean fair procedure, is not a fixed or rigid concept, but, rather, is a flexible standard which varies depending upon the nature of the interest affected, and the circumstances of the deprivation." 84 In Goss, the Supreme Court stated that "the Due Process Clause . . . forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty" and that, "'[w]here a person's good name, 77 See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222-23 (deciding the case of whether a university's dismissal of a medical degree program student violated due process rights). 78 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1964) . 79 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due."). 80 837 F.2d 7, 9-12 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the district court did not err in deciding that a public university's hearing procedures implicated due process protections for an accused student, citing liberty and property interests). 81 See Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D. Me. 2005). 82 Gorman, III v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 395 (1914)) ("The hearing, to be fair in the due process sense, implies that the person adversely affected was afforded the opportunity to respond, explain, and defend. Whether the hearing was fair depends upon the nature of the interest affected and all of the circumstances of the particular case."). 83 Id. at 12 ("The time-honored phrase 'due process of law' expresses the essential requirement of fundamental fairness."). 84 Id. Various lower courts have discussed the concept of what constitutes a fair hearing in the context of university disciplinary proceedings, and some courts have centered the inquiry around which procedures best guarantee both the student's interests in his private property and liberty interests in pursuing an education, as well as the state's interests in financial and administrative burdens for schools when stringent procedural requirements are implemented. 86 These courts have held that due process imposes minimum requirements in an academic setting, and these requirements very reasonably include that:
(1) the student must be advised of the charges against him; (2) he must be informed of the nature of the evidence against him; (3) he must be given an opportunity to be heard in his own defense; and (4) 
1970) (citation omitted)). The Court in
Keene v. Rodgers took the requirements for fairness a step further, adding three more factors to the inquiry: (1) the student must be permitted the assistance of a lawyer, at least in major disciplinary proceedings; (2) he must be permitted to confront and to cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) he must be afforded the right to an impartial tribunal, which must make written findings. 316 F. Supp. at 221.
88 "The normal standard of proof in civil cases is preponderance of the evidence. Under that standard, the evidence must establish a probability that an assertion is true, i.e., that it is more probable than not that the assertion is true. the evidence standard in California's bill is insufficient in comparison to this substantial evidence requirement, 90 which otherwise requires something "strongly made," "considerable in quantity," or "significantly great." 91 In light of this literal reading, due process in school disciplinary proceedings does and should require more than what the preponderance of the evidence standard that California's legislation mandates.
92
All disciplinary proceedings in schools that receive federal funding must comply with the requirements of Title IX. 93 In the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") infamous "Dear Colleague Letter" issued in April of 2011, the agency required schools to adhere to a preponderance of the evidence standard when evaluating sexual harassment and violence complaints. 94 The OCR supported this decision with a circular and conclusory argument that, "in order for a school's grievance procedures to be consistent with Title IX standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evidence standard" because "grievance procedures using [a] higher standard of proof are inconsistent with the standard of proof established for violations of the civil rights laws, and [so] are not equitable under Title IX." 95 Title IX violations involve civil law issues which the trier of fact evaluates by a preponderance of the evidence standard.
96 Such violations concerning civil issues regarding equality in academic institutions represent a class of cases fundamentally different from situations involving a student charged with sexual violenceconduct that is not only wholly detestable, but potentially criminal. Sexual assault cases carry up to a felony-level sentence if tried in criminal court. 97 Title IX does not provide sufficient justification for use of a preponderance of the evidence 90 Id.
91
Substantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantial (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 92 The preponderance of the evidence standard was likely implemented as a result of the standard outlined in OCR's Dear Colleague Letter. See Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 58, at 11-12. 93 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 94 See Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 58, at 10-11. 95 Id. at 11 (specifying this heightened standard as "clear and convincing evidence"). 96 See supra note 92. 97 See supra note 65. Students who face suspension and expulsion for sexual harassment, violence, or rape, have much at stake: their academic freedom, their financial and personal interests in pursuing their education, and their compelling private interests due to the nature of the crime involved, 105 including the potential for further consequences, their general reputation, their good standing in the community, and their good standing with themselves. Students facing background checks for future employment or seeking eventual admittance to their state bar could face serious consequences if employers and administrators discover a disciplinary record entailing a suspension or expulsion for sexual violence. A student facing disciplinary action for alleged sexual assault, like all students facing disciplinary action from a school, maintains the interest "to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process, with all of its unfortunate consequences."
106
Although due process "will not shield [the accused] from suspensions properly imposed, . . . it disserves both his interest and the interest of the State if his suspension is in fact unwarranted."
107 As the court explained in Gorman, "[t]he interests of students in completing their education, as well as avoiding unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational environment, and the accompanying stigma are, of course, paramount."
108
Due to the particularly heinous conduct involved in complaints involving sexual assault, the bar for proof should be set high enough to warrant substantial evidence as a cause for sanction. 109 This Note does not advocate that all disciplinary committee boards use a heightened standard in evaluating all types of student conduct, 110 but when the accusation is as severe as that of sexual violence, the aforementioned considerations support some level of heightened review. 106 Goss, 419 U.S. at 579. 107 
Id. (emphasis added).
108 Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14. 109 See Wright, supra note 87, at 1059-82. 110 Other offenses such as plagiarism, academic dishonesty, or other less-severe criminal violations may not warrant such heightened consideration. A standard of review for these offenses is not discussed in the content of this Note. 
Why Due Process Extends Beyond the Accused
In addition to the multitude of due process implications for the accused arising from implementation of a preponderance of the evidence standard, a lower standard of proof operates against victims and against general sexual assault reform, both publicly and culturally. The standard of proof judicial systems utilize reflects our societal values regarding the action alleged and ensures due process procedural safeguards for those accused. In turn, evaluating crimes as grave as sexual harassment and violence with a mere preponderance of the evidence standard belittles sexual harassment and violence by suggesting that these crimes do not require significant proof or complete investigation and evaluation. While such a result may capture more rapists on campus, 111 it will likely dismantle increased awareness of sexual assault and consent education as well as cultural reform-issues finally at the forefront of political debate. Rape is not a civil matter; it is a violent crime that society must evaluate as such, whether in a criminal court or in a school disciplinary committee board room.
In reality, a victim may more easily manipulate a preponderance of the evidence standard. Alleging a lack of consent when such consent was freely given may be all that a victim needs to establish culpability.
112 When a disciplinary committee bases its decision on whether the accused more likely than not committed an act of sexual assault, many will quickly doubt the validity of the surrounding disciplinary consequences, and the student population and public at large will not give those decisions much weight or authority. Universities and colleges, already in the hot seat for poor investigations, will likely err on the side of caution by penalizing the accused. Disciplinary consequences, if too quickly handed out, will become a joke to both students and the public. With more students receiving sanctions in this fashion, the seriousness of both the crime and its 111 Justice Harlan explains in In re Winship:
If . . . the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each. 114 Senate Bill No. 967 shifts public attention to those who are falsely accused, rather than to victims, heightening suspicion of sexual violence reports and patronizing the disparaging impact of such crimes. Victims of sexual assault deserve not only justice, but to be heard and respected. Legislators should strive towards creating a system that allows one to advocate for a better understanding of consent and sexuality while also maintaining fairness in proceedings. Instead, the preponderance of the evidence standard only serves to depreciate the legitimacy of accusations of sexual assault. 115 Furthermore, without stringent due process protections for the accused, racial and class prejudices will likely result in consequences for some students based on their minority or class status. The lowered preponderance standard establishing quasi-criminal culpability at the university level may result in victimization of the innocent-accused through a negative, class-based ripple effect, "unleash[ing] a lower standard onto police and prosecutors . . . incapable of avoiding racial or class prejudice," ultimately falling "on people of color and working class students in our 113 "The bill's broad definitions would serve to dissipate scarce resources and make it harder for victims to be believed." COMM. ON , 2014) , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/naomi-shatz/feminists-we-are-not-winn_b_ 6071500.html ("We as feminists are failing if we make our victories dependent on eschewing the fundamental rights and principles of our legal system was founded on-fairness, due process, a presumption of innocence-in order to obtain findings of guilt in sexual assault cases without regard to facts of individual cases."). 116 By implementing a preponderance of the evidence standard, California's affirmative consent law further fails to ensure protections for students against racial and class-based prejudices.
IV. WHY AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT TOLLS AN AFFIRMATIVE
"NO"
A. "Yes Means Yes" Has the Same Administrative Problems as "No Means No"
In the "no means no" versus "yes means yes" debate, the discussion often focuses on one of two solutions: proving or disproving a "yes" or a "no." The "yes means yes" movement potentially 117 embodies necessary cultural awareness of the concept of affirmative consent in order to makes strides "towards healthy sexuality"
118 by promoting increased communication between partners. However, "healthy sexuality" does not need, and should not mandate, explicit verbal consent at every stage of an encounter, from "'May I kiss you?' to 'May I undo your blouse? '" 119 Rather, a healthier, positive view of human sexuality includes acknowledgement that one gives and revokes consent in a variety of ways. David Bernstein, a professor at George Mason University School of Law, points out that California's legislation polices and deems illegal "a lot of normal sexual conduct" through regulation of sexual behaviors that legislators likely did not intend when enacting Senate Bill No. 967. 120 Additionally, Harvard law professors have Sexual assaults occurring on university campuses are very much the business of colleges and universities and, at least to some extent, their responsibility to combat. Universities may be the fastest vehicles for providing immediate protection to student victims; they can quickly initiate necessary measures, such as separating a victim from the accused until proceedings have concluded. 131 However, using university protocol as the only catalyst for sexual assault reform ignores the reality that sexual assault does not solely happen on college campuses and that colleges and universities are notorious for mishandling cases by failing to investigate and punish students.
C. A Step Away from the University System
Senate Bill No. 967, supposedly a "victory for women," 132 can do better to serve victims of sexual assault. Legislation should attempt to increase the effectiveness of investigations and focus on specific, key issues that pose problems in disciplinary hearings. It should not attempt to control the sexual encounter, itself. Rape cannot be prevented. However, implementing effective policies in universities which provide a greater understanding of healthy sexual behavior, while increasing resources for student victims, would have a stronger impact on improving the issues which have given rise to so many Title IX investigations. 133 Finally, legislation could better incentivize schools to use the actual police and court systems for sexual assault proceedings in order to more fairly and uniformly punish offenders and protect victims. Although Senate Bill No. 967 requires schools to implement a policy that provides written notification to the victim about coordination with law enforcement, these requirements could extend to "nudge universities toward the court system-with measures such as civil protective orders-and away from using campus judicial systems," 134 thereby encouraging and empowering victims to report their sexual assaults, as so many go unreported. 135 The legislation encourages universities to handle these cases in- 133 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 6. 134 Nelson, supra note 120.
135 TRACY ET AL., supra note 130, at 9. house with a limited system that bypasses essential due process protections for the accused. This fails to incentivize schools to provide a victim full entitlement to justice through the criminal court system, as colleges and universities can only expel student perpetrators.
U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L
V. CONCLUSION
Senate Bill No. 967 not only fails to realistically address the issue of sexual assault on campus, but it also targets the fundamentally wrong issues. This Note does not dispute that a standard of affirmative consent may serve as a strong catalyst for much-needed cultural change regarding how society views both sex and sexual violence. Broad reorientation about how society approaches sex may serve as a strong force in better defining consent and ensuring better communication between partners. 136 In fact, much of California's law is positive by requiring all colleges and universities to enter into agreements and collaborative partnerships with existing on-campus and community-based organizations to offer resources to students, including counseling, health services, mental health services, and legal assistance, and by implementing comprehensive prevention and outreach programs.
137
Many of the goals behind affirmative consent legislation are not merely appropriate, but also vital, to shift society's cultural perspective of sex and sexual violence. This Note does not doubt the need for such change in mentality. Perpetuating the affirmative consent standard in sex education in middle schools, high schools, and throughout post-secondary institutions could very well achieve long-lasting improvements aimed at healthy and consensual sexual behavior that will positively develop how the upcoming generation views such issues.
Yet, while this new approach to sexual assault may seem like "justice for the years of turning a blind eye to sexual assaults of university students," 138 the legislation's dismantling of essential constitutional due process protections in order to achieve this goal will not provide true, long-standing sexual assault reform. Instead, it will only further skepticism and doubt, broaden any gray areas 138 Shatz, supra note 115.
